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v. A. W. Scott Co., 144 Minn. 173, 174 N. W. 832 (1919), although one
case allows recovery in this instance. Smart v. Bissonette, 106 Conn.
447, 138 Atl. 365 A son or daughter, owning the automobile, should not
be liable under the family purpose doctrine when other members of
the family are in control of it. Hall v. Scott, 231 Ill. App. 494 (1923).
However, a parent should be responsible for the negligent driving of
a person, authorized by his minor child, or spouse, to drive on the
theory of imputed agency. Thizton v. Palmer, supra; Cohen v. Borgenecht, 144 N. Y. Supp. 399 (1913). The doctrine should apply whether
the member of the family is alone. Miller v. Weak, supra, or driving
other members of the family. Stowe v. Morris, supra. It should include injuries both to person and to property. Thixton v. Palmer,
supra; Steel v. Age's Adm'x, supra; Wallace v. Hall, supra.
In summary, it may be stated that the doctrine has filled a long
felt need, and should continue to be followed until ample legislation has taken its place. Since it can be supported only on public
policy and convenience it should be limited so as only to supply a
remedy for those evils it was brought forward to eradicate. Therefore,
it should be extended with caution and with trepidation, and should
apply solely to injuries caused by the family automobile.
HARRY I.
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A contract for sale of flour providing liquidated damages in case
of the buyer's failure to furnish shipping instructions, on the basis
of one cent per day per barrel of flour from date of sale to date of
termination as expense for carrying plus 20 cents per barrel as cost
of selling, and plus or minus amount of difference between market
value of wheat on date of. sale, and date of termination, times 4.6 times
the number of barrels of flour, was held valid and enforceable, where
it was shown that because of fluctuation in price of wheat it was
necessary in order to stabilize the business to purchase sufficient wheat
to fill an order for flour at the time the order was taken. Quaile & Co,
v. William Kelly Milling Go. 184 Ark. 717, 43 S. W. (2d) 369, 79 A.
L. R. 183 (1931). The court said: "The general rule is that contracts
for liquidated damages, when reasonable in their character, are not to
be regarded as penalties, and may be enforced between the parties.
But agreements to pay fixed sums, plainly without relation to any
probable damage which may follow a breach, will not be enforced.
Kothe, Trustee, v. R. C. Taylor Trust, 280 U. S. 224, 50 S. Ct. 142, 72
L. Ed., 832 and Robins v. Plant,174 Ark. 639, 297 S. W. 1027, 59 A. L. R.
1128." The courts that have been called upon to interpret such stipulations for payment of a designated sum, in case of breach of a contract
for the -sale of goods to be manufactured, have without exception held
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tiaem to be liquidatod damages and not penalties, where the 1irobable
,damageh vhich might follow a 'breach rdre Unceruth and the amoiffit
appeard reasonable, ab of the time the contiact was -entered.
*rovideb
Laab e Flour M'ills Co. v. darignaho 49 F. (2d) 151 (1931); Standard
9
Tilton Mill Co. v. Toole, 293 Ala. 4t0, 137 So. 13 (1931) ; Christian Mills
v. Stern Flour Go., 247 Ill. App. 1 (1931); Sheffield-King Milling Co.
v. Jacobs, 170 Wis. 399, 175 N. W. 796 (1920); Sheffield-King Milling
Co. v. Domestic Science Baking Co., 95 Ohio St. 186, 115 N. E. 1014
(1917); New Prague Milling Co. v. Hewett Grain and Prov. Co. o1
Bscanaba, 226 MIch. 35, 196 N. W. 890 (1924).
While the courts all reach practically the same result in this type
of case, the language used would indicate a difference in the method
,of reasoning that is astonishing. This can best be shown by quotations from some in the decisions.
In Yerxa, Andrews - Thurston v. Randazzo Macaroni Mfg. Co., 315
Mo. 927, 288 S. W. 20 (1926), the formula used by the majority of the
courts was stated as follows: "The question is one to be determined by
the contradt, fairly construed, and, in arriving at a determination,
the courts will seek to arrive at the intention of the parties from a
consideration of the contract as a whole, the situation of the parties,
the subject matter of the contract and all the circumstanbes surrounding its execution, together with the ease or difficulty of measuring the
breach in damages, and the magnitude of the stipulated sum, not only
as compared with the value of the subject of the contract, but in proportion to the probable consequences of the breach". 17 C. J. 936; 8
R. C. L. 561.
The rule as stated in Christian Mills v. Berthold Stern Flour Co.,
*247 Ill. App. 1, (1928), representing the minority in decided cases, but
:howing the recent tendency in thought on the subject, is as follows:
"In .ur judgment it Is the law that if the contractual formula, as to
the measurement of damages, which the defendant prescribed in its
,offer, and which became an integral part of the completed contract,
was fair and reasonable-having in mind the particular business involved, and the kind of merchandise to be manufactured and soldthen the formula which pertained to the seller's damages should have
been recognized in the trial of the case as lawful and properly binding
upon both nartles."
The Federal courts have adopted much the same language as the
Missouri coifrt did In the Ye'rxa case, &hpra,ds is shown in the following quotation 'froih Ldrbee Flbitr Mills Co. V. Carignano, supra, when
It quoted from W4se v. U. S., 249 U. S. 361, 39 S. Ct. 303, 63 L. Ed. 647
(1918), as follbi-. "The sibje'ct of the Interpretatofi of brovlsions
for liquidated damagbs in c6ntracts, as contradistinguished from such
as J)-ovide fo-rpenaltleg, was elaborately and comprehensively consid'eredby 'this 06urt in Sun Printing & Publishing Assn. v. Moore, 183
VU. S. 642. 22 S. 't. 240. 46 L. Ed. 366, a'pxilied In U. S. v. Bethleheft
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Steel Co., 205 U. S. 105, 27 S. Ct. 450, 51 L. Ed 631, and the result of
the modern decisions was determined to be that in such cases courts
will endeavor, by a construction of the agreement the parties havemade, to ascertain what their intention was when they entered such
stipulation for payment, of a designated sum or upon a designated basis
for a breach of a covenant of their contract, precisely as they seek for
the intention of the parties in other respects. When that intention is.
clearly ascertainable from the writing, effect will be given to the provision, as freely as to any other, where the damages are uncertain in
nature or amount, or are difficult of ascertainment or where the amount
stipulated for is not so extravagant, or disproportionate to the amount
of property loss, as to show that compensation was not the object aimed
at or as to imply fraud, mistake, circumvention or oppression."
No Kentucky case has been found dealing specifically with the
type of stipulation here under discussion. But the Kentucky court, in
enforcing a provision for liquidated damages for breach of a contract
to sell land, set out its formula as follows: "Where damages iesultina from the breach of an agreement would be uncertain, and evidence.
of their amount very difficult to obtain, and the fair import of the
agreement is that the amount of money in it is specified and agreed
on to save expense and avoid the difficulty of proving an actual dam-.
age, it will be regarded as liquidated damages." Cook v. Johzson, 241
Ky. 452, 44 S. W. (2d) 457 (1931). In Commonwealth v. Ginn & Co.,
111 Ky. 110, 63 S. W. 467 (1901), the court. stated as a general rule.
that " . .. it is a question of construction, to be decided according to.
the intention of the parties at the time of the agreement, as to whether
the sum named in the contract to be paid upon its breach by the one
failing is liquidated damages, or merely a penalty".
As may be seen from these quotations the courts in the Missouri
case, the Federal case, and the Kentucky case, claim that their decisions are based upon the intention of the parties and the proper construction of the contract. The Illinois court, in the Christian Mills case,
supra, based its decision upon the reasonableness of the sum stipulated
for as compensation for the loss occasioired by the breach. It is submitted that this is the true basis for the decision in all the cases and
that the majority of the courts have tried to work these cases out by
rules of construction when, in fact, they do not raise a question of
construction.
If it can be said that the courts should "give effect to the clearly
expressed will of the parties," the recovery of penalties will always be
allowed. It is always the will of the parties that the sum stipulated
for shall be paid if the main agreement is not performed. It is not a
question of construction of a stipulation of a contract, nor a question
of rules of damages, but is a question of the legal validity of a stipulation of a. contract. It cannot be said that the language used will bear
the construction which the courts put upon it nor can it be said that
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the parties expressed their will that the result of the stipulation should
be the result enforced by the courts. The courts cannot mean to hold
that the interpretation which they put upon the contract is the meaning intended to be put upon it by the parties or a meaning which the
language properly construed actually conveys. The real determination is not a construction of the language used nor a determination
of the intention of the parties, but is a question of whether the stipulation which the parties have provided as a payment by the defaulting
party, in case of breach, is reasonable under the circumstances, so that
it will be enforced, or whether it is unreasonable and should therefore
be disregarded and the amount of damages suffered be ascertained by
the jury. If the matter of intention means anything, it means: Did
the parties intend that the sum stipulated for should be a determination in advance of the probable loss of the seller, in case of breach,
or did they intend it to be a ;punishment to be held in terrorem over
the buyer? And this is not determined so that the courts can carry
out the intentions of the parties, necessarily, but in order to decide
whether or not the thing they intended to be done was enforceable.
The misleading character of the alleged search for intention is
brought out by Marshal J., in Seeman v. Biemann, 108 Wis. 365, 84
N. W. 490 (1900). "While courts adhere to the doctrine that the intention of the parties must govern in regard to whether damages mentioned in their contracts are liquidated, they uniformly take such liberties in regard to the matter, based on arbitrary rules of construction,
so called, as may be necessary to effect judicial notions of equity. .. .
The judicial power thus exercised cannot properly be justified under
any ordinary rule of judicial construction . . . But in determining
whether an amount agreed upon as damages was intended as liquidated
damages or as penalty, rules of language are ignored and the express
intent of the parties is made to give way to the equity of the particular
case, having due regard to precedents."
Two quotations from Williston on Contracts will serve as a concluslon--"Though the law can not create contractual obligations which
are not based on the expressed intentions of the parties, it can excuse
the performance either of conditions or promises agreed upon by the
parties for any reason which seems to it just. The mere fact that
a promise or condition is somewhat harsh or unfair in its operation.
is not enough to furnish such an excuse, but a principle of somewhat
vague boundaries prohibits the enforcement of forfeitures or penalties." Sec. 769, Williston on Contracts (Student Edition).
"In spite of the language of cases regarding the intention of the
parties, there is little doubt that a sum named as liquidated damages,
in order to be given effect, must be reasonable in amount. To be sure,
under the recent decisions of the most authoritative courts, the primary
question seems to be whether the parties honestly endeavored to fix
a sum equivalent in value to the breach. But as has been seen, the
chief, almost the only, means of determining whether the parties in
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good faith endeavored to assess the damages, is afforded by the amount
of damages stipulated for, and the nature of the breach upon which
the stipulation was agreed to become operative. This is but saying in
other words that the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the stipulation is decisive." See. 779, Williston on Contracts (Student Edition).
THURAIN TODD.

